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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of corporate governance on 
voluntary disclosure of different types of information in annual reports of Malaysian listed firms.  
Design/methodology/approach - A linear regression model is used to test the association 
between the level of voluntary disclosure of five key information categories and corporate 
governance. The sample consists of 100 firms over three different socio-economic periods:  
1996, 2001 and 2006. 
Findings - There are significant increases in all the key information categories with better 
communication most pronounced between 1996 and 2001, and a noticeable lower level of 
communication growth between 2001 and 2006. The strength of a firm’s corporate governance 
structure clearly influences the voluntary disclosure of information relating to corporate and 
strategic directions, directors and senior management, financial and capital markets, forward-
looking projections and corporate social responsibility in 2001 and 2006.  
Research limitations/implications – The use of a governance index to arrive at an overall 
corporate governance score has the potential to mask major underlying relationships of 
individual governance attributes. The use of the self-constructed disclosure indices may also 
omit certain information items that are employed in other prior studies. Moreover, the different 
categories of disclosures are solely constructed on the information disclosed in the annual reports 
without considering the alternative avenues.  
Practical implications – The results will assist regulators and policy-makers to better 
understand the impact of corporate governance on the voluntary disclosure of different types of 
corporate information in Malaysia.  
Originality/value – This study generates evidence of the changing scene of management 
voluntary disclosure practices embedded in the corporate governance framework in a developing 
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Voluntary disclosures are of growing importance in today’s capital market (Schuster and 
O'Connell, 2006). The contemporary phenomenon of globalisation of the stock market and 
convergence of accounting standards has raised the interests of capital market participants for 
enhanced information beyond the minimum statutory requirement in order to facilitate the 
decision-making process (Berradino, 2001). In general, disclosure encompasses release of 
financial and non-financial information, information relating to directors and key executives, 
management discussion and analysis and forward-looking information. Meek et al. (1995) posit 
that the separation of voluntary disclosure into categories is desirable as it reflects variations in 
decision relevance for users.  
 
In recent years, the financial crisis and corporate scandals have brought corporate governance 
reform to the forefront of the regulatory agenda (Johnson et al., 2000; Millar et al., 2005). Firms 
have taken steps to strengthen their governance practices and enhance corporate accountability. 
Corporate governance is defined as the ‘system by which companies are directed and controlled’ 
(Cadbury Report, 1992: para 2.5). The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance take a 
broader perspective, describing corporate governance as a set of relationships between a 
company’s board, its shareholders and stakeholders (OECD, 1999). The common tenet in all 
governance systems is the mechanism to facilitate the control of management and the 
achievement of maximization of firm value. The implementation of corporate governance in 
monitoring management is vitally important to reduce information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders (Jensen, 2000). Given the monitoring role of corporate 
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governance, it can be argued that firms with better corporate governance are likely to increase 
management incentives to disclose more corporate information for their stakeholders.   
 
A prime motivation for this study stems from the fact that Malaysia has undergone a series of 
important regulatory regime and governance changes since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
Malaysian financial reporting practices were governed by a merit-based regulatory regime until 
1997 when the new reporting framework and disclosure-based regime were phased in. In 
addition, the Malaysian regulatory bodies initiated more corporate governance reforms 
emphasizing enhanced transparency. The implicit assumption in these initiatives is that there is a 
link between corporate governance and firms’ disclosure practices. Given these important 
changes, here we investigate the association between the strength of corporate governance 
structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian listed 
companies. The dual aims of this study are: (i) to determine the extent of key categories of 
voluntary disclosure; and (ii) to determine if corporate governance is associated with these 
important categories of voluntary disclosure by Malaysian listed firms over the turbulent period 
1996 to 2006. 
 
The evolutionary process of strengthening the Malaysian accounting and governance landscape 
presents an opportunity for an in-depth study of the extent of information communicated to 
external users. This study draws on a longitudinal sample of the same randomly selected 100 
firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia stock exchange in 1996, 2001 and 2006. These three key 
periods are chosen due to the major fundamental reforms put in place in each intervening period. 
This longitudinal study is also important in that the association between different types of 
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voluntary disclosure and corporate governance structures in different regulatory regimes is rarely 
tested in the literature.  
 
The study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it extends recent literature on the 
association of corporate governance practices of Malaysian listed firms and extent of disclosure. 
Currently, there is a lack of research examining the association between the strength of 
governance structure and disclosure practices of firms. Reporting practices in Malaysia have 
evolved in line with changes in regulatory and legislative initiatives in Malaysia and also as a 
consequence of external shocks relating to financial crises and corporate collapses. Thus, it is 
important to gain an understanding of the key motivating factors and methods in the international 
context linking governance structure and management’s disclosure incentives and practices. 
Second, while similar governance based research has been discussed separately in recent 
literature, not one study has examined the relation of strength of governance structure on the 
disclosure of various categories of information. Finally, this study utilizes a novel and objective 
measure of strength of governance structure based on the best practice recommendations and 
principles released by the Malaysian Securities Commission. 
 
The results of this study show that there is a significant and positive association between strength 
of corporate governance structures and firms’ communication of corporate and strategic, 
financial and capital market, forward-looking and corporate social responsibility information in 
firms’ 2001 and 2006 annual reports. Corporate governance structure becomes an important 
determinant post the Asian financial crisis when regulatory features are enhanced and put in 
place. The spirit of corporate governance principles and recommendations is largely aimed at 
encouraging management to provide information more extensively on a voluntary basis in order 
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to enhance corporate transparency. The findings thus provide helpful empirical justifications for 
the regulatory regime change. The study also contributes to the current global debate on the role 
of corporate governance structure in enhancing corporate transparency. 
 
The paper is structured in the following way. The next section reviews the evolution of the 
Malaysian accounting and regulatory environment. The third section discusses prior research and 
develops the main corporate governance hypotheses. Data and the research approach are 
described in the fourth section while the results are presented in the fifth section. The sixth 
section summarizes the robustness tests undertaken. The final section provides the concluding 
comments.  
 
2.0 Malaysian Accounting and Governance Environment  
The regulatory system is identified as one of the external corporate governance mechanisms 
(Denis and McConnell, 2002). The market for corporate control is not prevalent in Malaysia 
(Faccio et al., 2006), thus the external corporate governance mechanism is largely reliant on 
regulatory bodies such as the Banking and Financial Institution Act, the Securities Commission 
Act, the Future Industry Act, the Company Commission of Malaysia and the Financial Reporting 
Act. There had been efforts to strengthen the aspects of good governance practices long before 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997, however, the efforts were done in a piecemeal basis (Abdul 
Rahman, 2006). In 1998, the High Level Finance Committee formed by the Malaysian Securities 
Commission conducted a detailed study on corporate governance which subsequently led to the 
introduction of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) to Malaysian listed 
companies in January 2001. The aim of the MCCG is to encourage disclosure by providing 
investors with timely and relevant information upon which decisions are made. Although 
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compliance with the principles and best practices of the MCCG is voluntary, listed firms are 
required to state in their annual reports the extent to which they have complied and to explain 
any circumstances that warrant deviations from best practices.   
 
In line with the initiative, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (now known as Bursa Malaysia) 
issued its revamped listing requirements which included corporate governance and continuing 
disclosure requirements. The move was widely recognized as a major milestone in Malaysian 
corporate governance reform in enhancing corporate disclosure.  
 
Prior to 1997, corporate reporting and disclosure in Malaysia was overseen by the professional 
accounting bodies. The regulatory regime governing the financial reporting practices of 
Malaysian listed firms was merit-based, under which regulators decided on the propriety of firm 
transactions and decisions. There was no concerted effort then to improve governance practices 
(Abdul Rahman, 2006). This regime arguably lowered market incentives for corporate voluntary 
disclosure. The accounting landscape evolved with the establishment of the new financial 
reporting framework, where the Financial Reporting Foundation and Malaysian Accounting 
Standard Board were set up under the Financial Reporting Act 1997. The Malaysian Securities 
Commission recommended the shift from a merit-based to disclosure-based regulatory 
framework, which passes responsibility of evaluating firm reporting practices to market 
participants. The shift to the new regime was initiated to promote a transparent and accountable 
capital market environment. Thus, enhanced disclosure becomes a necessity for the market to 
monitor company affairs under this new regime.  
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External events drove even more changes. For instance, global accounting scandals emanating 
from high profile corporate scandals generated increased controversy over corporate accounting 
practices and the quality of information disclosed to investors. The Malaysian regulatory bodies 
continued their efforts to strengthen governance and disclosure practices as reflected in the 
corporate disclosure framework under the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement where the Best 
Practices in Corporate Disclosure document was initiated in August 2004. The Best Practices in 
Corporate Disclosure advocates greater disclosures, an initiative in line with the disclosure-
based regulatory regime implemented in 2001. Although these best practices are voluntary, 
Malaysian listed firms are ‘highly encouraged’ to incorporate these guidelines into their own 
disclosure practices, which aimed at assisting companies to move beyond minimum disclosure 
thresholds (Bursa Malaysia, 2004). This initiative marks another milestone in the development of 
corporate governance best practices for Malaysian listed firms (Yusoff, 2004). In addition, the 
IFRS convergence caused an important change in the Malaysian accounting landscape with 
greater alignment of the local MASB accounting standards with IFRS occurring in 2006.  
 
Changes in the external regulatory regime are likely to impact on firm internal governance. In 
Malaysia, the change in regulatory philosophy emphasizes enhanced corporate governance and 
accountability as well as a reduction of information asymmetry through increased 
communication. Since the shift in regulatory philosophy took place over some years in Malaysia, 
this presents an excellent opportunity to undertake a longitudinal study to examine the influence 
of corporate governance on firms’ disclosure practices. As disclosure is one of the main pillars of 
good corporate governance, it is expected that the communication provided in the annual reports 
will increase over time. To meet the needs of increasingly sophisticated investors, it is not 
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unreasonable to presume Malaysian firms are likely to disclose a greater level and variety of 
information on a voluntary basis.  
 
3.0 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The decision to disclose information often depends on management’s personal wealth 
considerations (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulate that 
separation of ownership and control of a firm provides the agent (manager) with the incentive to 
serve their personal interests at the expense of the principal’s (shareholder’s) interests. In the 
context of the firm, a major issue is the information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders. Managers, as self-interested agents, possess information about the present and 
likely future performance of the firm that is superior to that acquired by shareholders. Managers 
can use their discretion to disclose or not disclose information to facilitate their engagement in 
opportunistic behaviour for personal gains (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Formal contracts are 
thus negotiated and written as a way of resolving agency conflicts. It may be possible that 
managers may voluntarily provide information in order to reduce bonding costs and encourage 
investors to invest in the company. Empirical studies have supported the agency’s theoretical 
justification for greater disclosure in the best interest of a firm (Botosan, 1997; Francis et al., 
2005; Khurana et al., 2006).  
 
A number of prior studies have investigated various determinants of firms’ voluntary disclosure 
practices. Most of these studies focus on the conventional firm-specific determinants such as 
size, leverage, industry and profitability (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; 
Leventis and Weetman, 2004; Hossain et al., 1994, 1995). However, more research is needed 
relating to corporate disclosure with particular corporate governance attributes such as board 
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composition, board committee formation and independence, CEO and board chairperson duality 
and audit committee formation and characteristics (Forker, 1992; Eng and Mak, 2003; Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001; Gul and Leung, 2004; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Donnelly 
and Mulcahy, 2008). Interestingly, these past studies do not produce consistent evidence 
regarding the impact of these individual governance attributes on corporate disclosure.  
 
Few studies focus on the strength of overall corporate governance and its effect on firms’ 
disclosure practices, although Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that a well-designed overall 
governance structure can help ensure firms achieve the optimum disclosure policy. Using a 
combination of corporate governance attributes to create a composite proxy measure, Byard et 
al. (2006) and Beekes and Brown (2006) document better-governed firms make more 
informative disclosure in US and Australian firms respectively. Similarly, Taylor et al. (2010) 
find that the financial risk management disclosure pattern is significantly and positively 
associated with the strength of corporate governance structure. Nonetheless, the primacy of 
corporate governance structure as an important determinant of a firm’s transparent policy is 
refuted. O’Sullivan et al. (2008) do not document the same conclusions using 2000 and 2002 
data. They report a consistent finding that the overall efficacy of the corporate governance 
system leads to disclosure of forward-looking information in the year 2000 only, but no similar 
finding is found for the year 2002. O’Sullivan et al. (2008) conclude that increased application of 
corporate governance mechanisms and tools do not necessarily lead to a higher incidence of 
forward-looking disclosure and question the effectiveness of such mechanisms in promoting 
greater transparency.  
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Research focusing on specific type of information disclosure is not as widespread as the overall 
voluntary disclosure. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) include different types of information as 
additional analysis in examining the extent of voluntary disclosure of Malaysian listed firms. 
Using year 2001 annual reports of Malaysian listed firms, they report that firm size and 
profitability are positively associated with strategic voluntary disclosure and financial voluntary 
disclosure. None of the corporate governance attributes is associated with different types of 
information disclosure. They further indicate that director ownership is negatively associated 
with the disclosure of financial and strategic information. Lim et al. (2007) examine the 
association between board composition and different types of voluntary disclosure of the 
Australian Top 500 companies. Their findings differ from Ghazali and Weetman (2006). They 
document that there is a positive association between board composition and voluntary strategic 
disclosure and forward-looking quantitative voluntary disclosure, but no association between 
board composition and financial voluntary disclosure.   
 
Other prior studies have found a link between forward-looking information and various corporate 
governance factors. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) report that firms with more outside directors 
on the board, a lower level of managerial ownership, a higher level of institutional share 
ownership and a smaller audit committee are more likely to make management earnings 
forecasts. Similarly, Ajinkya et al. (2005) reveal that the management earnings forecasts are 
positively associated with more independent boards and greater institutional ownership.  
 
In terms of corporate social responsibility (CSR) information, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) 
show that Malaysian firms with a high level of director ownership tend to disclose less CSR. 
They do not report any association between corporate governance attributes and CSR. Haniffa 
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and Cooke (2005) document that the composition of non-executive directors is negatively 
associated with CSR, whilst chairpersons with multiple directorships have a positive association 
with CSR. Rouf (2011) reports a positive association between the proportion of independent 
directors and corporate social responsibility disclosure. These studies have produced mixed 
evidence regarding the impact of individual governance attributes on voluntary disclosure of 
CSR. 
 
Essentially, the adoption of the principles of corporate governance arguably monitors senior 
management in their dealings with stakeholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). The enactment of corporate 
governance principles should contribute to the reduction of information asymmetry between the 
board and suppliers of capital. The transparency and disclosure initiatives are embedded in the 
MCCG, which suggests that firms with stronger governance structures are more likely to provide 
extensive information to stakeholders. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that a stronger governance 
structure as reflected in a higher corporate governance score is associated with more extensive 
voluntary disclosure of different types of information. For the purpose of this study, the 
information voluntarily communicated by sample firms can be categorized into: (i) corporate and 
strategic; (ii) financial and capital market; (iii) directors and senior management; (iv) forward 
looking; and (v) corporate social responsibility information (see Appendix 1). 
 
To formally test the influence of a firm’s overall corporate governance score on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure, in five key communication categories, the following hypotheses are 
proposed:  
H1a:  All else being equal, a firm’s strength of governance structure is positively associated 
with the extent of voluntary disclosure of corporate and strategic information. 
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H1b: All else being equal, a firm’s strength of governance structure is positively associated 
with the extent of voluntary disclosure of financial and capital market information. 
 
H1c: All else being equal, a firm’s strength of governance structure is positively associated 
with the extent of voluntary disclosure of directors and senior management 
information. 
 
H1d: All else being equal, a firm’s strength of governance structure is positively associated 
with the extent of voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information. 
 
H1e: All else being equal, a firm’s strength of governance structure is positively associated 
with the extent of voluntary disclosure of corporate social responsibility information. 
 
These hypotheses are cross-sectionally tested in each of the time periods to ascertain if 
corporate governance structure in the three stages of development, viz. 1996, 2001 and 2006, 
remains relevant in influencing voluntary disclosure of various categories of information. The 
year 1996 represents the pre-Asian financial crisis phase when the accounting landscape was a 
merit-based regulatory regime. The 2001 year is selected to represent the post-financial crisis 
phase when the disclosure-based regime governed the accounting landscape and the 
implementation of the MCCG. The 2006 year is nominated to represent post-Enron and IFRS 
driven changes. This temporal analysis allows the examination of the change of voluntary 
disclosure practices over time. 
 
4.0 Methodology and Data Collection 
4.1 Sample 
Data are collected from three critically important time periods in the evolution of Malaysian 
financial accounting. These are the annual reports for 1996 (representing the pre-Asian financial 
crisis period), 2001 (post crisis), and 2006 (post Enron and the IFRS adjustment period), of a 
random sample of the same 100 Malaysian listed firms, representing a total of 300 firm-years 
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observations. The selection criteria for the sample firms are: (i) availability of annual reports of 
companies for all the three periods; (ii) companies selected in 1996 must remain listed on the 
stock exchange in the other periods; (iii) all banks, unit trust, insurance and finance companies 
are excluded from the study due to different regulatory requirements; and (iv) 20 firms are 
chosen from each of the five key industry categories in Malaysia using stratified random 
sampling techniques. These categories are: (i) trading/services; (ii) consumer products; (iii) 
industrial products; (iv) construction and property; and (v) plantation sectors. The year 1996 
represents the base year from which the sample firms are randomly drawn.  
 
4.2 Dependent Variable 
The extent of disclosure is measured by a voluntary disclosure index (DI) comprising a 
comprehensive list of 85 voluntary disclosure items. The voluntary disclosure index items are 
based on the past literature such as Meek et al. (1995); Barako et al. (2006); and Ghazali and  
Weetman (2006). The preliminary checklist consists of 151 items and is subject to a thorough 
screening by two independent individuals who are qualified Chartered Accountants from the Big 
Four accounting firms with specific knowledge of Malaysian accounting practices and disclosure 
issues. The original voluntary disclosure checklist is then double-checked against the evolving 
applicable approved accounting standards in Malaysia, the Companies Act 1965, Bursa Malaysia 
Listing Requirements, and any other relevant statutes or pronouncements that may be mandated 
in Malaysian reporting practices. Based on this analysis, 66 of the original 151 items are 
removed from the disclosure index. This extensive screening process1 ensures that the items in 
the checklist remain voluntary in nature throughout the three sample frame periods.  
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The content of the annual reports is then classified and placed2 within each of the five major 
categories of disclosure information (see Appendix 1) which are deemed to be relevant in 
decision-making (Meek et al., 1995). Strategic and financial information categories have obvious 
decision relevance for investors whereas the non-financial information category focusing on 
firm’s social responsibility targets a wide spectrum of stakeholders. According to Chau and Gray 
(2002), the variables affecting voluntary disclosure choices are likely to be affected by 
information type. For the purpose of this study, voluntary disclosure is categorized into five 
types: (i) the corporate and strategic information; (ii) financial and capital market data 
information; (iii) directors and senior management information; (iv) forward-looking 
information; and (v) corporate social responsibility. These classifications are commonly used in 
past literature (Barako et al., 2006; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). The nature of each of these five 
information categories is discussed as follows:  
(1) Corporate and strategic information relates to firm background, market and competition, 
industry competitiveness and prevailing economic and political situations that can affect a 
firm’s operational performance. Strategy impacts on many aspects of a firm, and ultimately 
affects a firm’s performance (Besanko et al., 2004). Thus, strategic information becomes the 
fabric of a firm’s disclosure in their annual reports (Ho and Wong, 2004). The survey carried 
out by Ho & Wong (2004) indicates that strategy information disclosure is important to 
firms’ stakeholders. Such non-financial information often proves fundamental to 
understanding the opportunities and risks of investing in a company. 
(2) Financial and capital market data information concerns the historical information presented 
in the accounts, including the key financial ratios, the review of the firm’s performance, 
wealth creation, as well as the trend of volume of shares traded, market capitalization and 
share prices. This quantitative information provides an overall understanding of the factors 
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that play a role in the performance and future growth of a company and may be of particular 
relevance for decision-making. This information constitutes the bedrock of disclosure 
especially to investors (OECD, 2001).  
(3) Directors and senior management concerns information about their qualifications, 
experience and positions held in the firm. It is reported in OECD (2003) that companies in 
Asia (including Malaysia) generally provide scant information on the background and 
remuneration of directors and key executives.  
(4) Forward-looking information refers to the information that relates to future prospects, 
forecasts, and the potential of a firm. This information provides insight into material issues 
facing a company, yet OECD (2003) reports that Asian companies often provide little 
guidance on these issues.  
(5) Corporate social responsibility (CSR) covers information about corporate philanthropy, 
environment, employees, and other information pertinent to society.  CSR, by itself, has been 
the subject of substantial academic research. Voluntary disclosure of this information may be 
used to reinforce the community’s perception of management’s responsiveness to specific 
social responsibility issues and to legitimize corporate actions (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; 
Gray et al., 1995). 
 
Each firm’s overall voluntary Disclosure Index (DI) score is calculated in aggregate and then 
again for each of the five categories and for each period. An item scores 1 if it is disclosed and 0 
if it is not, subject to the applicability of the item concerned. The DI score for each company is 
additive and unweighted to avoid subjectivity (Cooke, 1989). A firm’s voluntary disclosure 
index for each category is defined as the ratio of actual disclosures to the maximum possible 
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score.  The disclosure index, calculated for each firm in each period, is mathematically 
represented as:   
  DIjt =     Actual number of disclosed items 
   Maximum possible disclosure items 
 
where DIjt = disclosure index being categorized into: (i) corporate and strategic disclosure index (CSD); 
(ii) financial and capital market disclosure index (FCMD); (iii) directors and senior management 
disclosure index (DSMD); (iv) forward looking disclosure index (FLD); and (v) corporate social 
responsibility disclosure index (CSRD) for firm j in year t. These indices are calculated separately for 
each firm in each of the three sample periods. 
 
4.3 Corporate governance as the predictor variable 
The principles and best practices of the MCCG and Chapter 15 of Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirement on corporate governance provide an official authoritative and objective source for 
the selection of corporate governance attributes for an aggregate measure. The focus is on the 
governance attributes that can be operational and have been deemed in the literature to be most 
relevant. This aggregation is composed of 13 important attributes as the measure of the corporate 
governance structure of a firm. These 13 governance attributes are tabulated in Table 1. Each of 
the attributes of corporate governance is measured as a dichotomous variable. A value of 1 is 
assigned for each corporate governance attribute present in the specific firm (these are presumed 
to reinforce the voluntary disclosure practice of a firm) and 0 otherwise. A firm receives a score 
ranging from 0 to 13 depending on the number of attributes satisfied. This approach is deemed to 
be appropriate for all three key sample time periods in view of the voluntary compliance with 
best practices of the MCCG. Firms with a low corporate governance score are presumed to have 
weaker governance structures, likely leading to a lesser extent of voluntary disclosure. A higher 
score is believed to signal a stronger governance structure that promises enhanced accountability 
and transparency. This is posited to lead to a greater extent of voluntary disclosure. All 13 
attributes are weighed equally to reduce subjectivity. The strength of a firm’s corporate 
 17 
governance structure is captured by creating a composite proxy measure, defined as the corporate 
governance score (CGS). The CGS, measured as a percentage, is treated as a continuous 
predictor variable in the statistical analysis. 
 
TABLE 1: Corporate governance score (CGS) items 
 Corporate governance attributes 
1 Are the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer performed by different persons? 
2 Do independent non-executive directors comprise at least one-third of the board 
membership? 
3 Does the board have a defined policy of management responsibilities of the board and 
CEO? 
4 Is the audit committee chaired by independent non-executive directors? 
5 Does the audit committee comprise at least three directors, a majority of whom are 
independent? 
6 Do at least two members of the audit committee have accounting or related financial 
management expertise? 
7 Is the remuneration committee chaired by independent non-executive director? 
8 Does the remuneration committee consist wholly of non-executive directors? 
9 Is structured remuneration policy in place, where remuneration to directors is contingent 
of performance? 
10 Is there any disclosure of the details of remuneration to each director in the annual 
report? 
11 Does the nomination committee consist exclusively of non-executive directors, a 
majority of whom are independent? 
12 Does the nomination committee adopt a formal procedure for appointments to the 
board? 
13 Does the company maintain a sound system of internal control - financial, operational, 
compliance and risk management - to safeguard shareholders' investment and 
companies' assets? 
The 13 corporate governance attributes are derived from the principles and best practices of the MCCG. These are 
used to create the corporate governance score (CGS) which is ranged from 0 to 13 depending on the number of 
conditions satisfied. A CGS score is calculated for each firm year across the three study periods.  
 
 
4.4 Control variables 
The disclosure decision is a complex and multi-faceted one, thus it is appropriate to consider the 
simultaneous effects of the independent and control variables on the disclosure outcome 
(Labelle, 2002). Following the practice in prior research, this study includes four standard 
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control variables: ownership concentration, firm size, leverage and industry in the statistical 
analysis.  
First, the degree of dispersion between ownership and management determines the level of 
monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and thereby the extent of voluntary disclosure. Agency 
theory argues that firms will disclose more information to reduce agency costs and information 
asymmetry in a diffused ownership environment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence, firms with 
a concentrated ownership structure are expected to disclose less information. Ownership 
concentration is measured by the proportion of shares held by the top five shareholders. Second, 
large firms tend to disclose information more extensively because of exposure to public scrutiny 
(Schipper, 1981), the need to raise capital at a lower cost (Botosan, 1997), and the need to 
minimize high agency costs typical in large companies. Firm size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets to reduce the impact of skewed data in the statistical analysis. Third, 
from the perspective of agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that high monitoring 
costs would be incurred by firms that are highly leveraged and that agency conflicts are 
exacerbated by the presence of bondholders in a firm’s capital structure. In Malaysia, financial 
institutions play an active role in the provision of funds to listed firms. A priori, there is an 
expectation that highly leveraged firms will disclose more information in their annual reports 
(Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994). Leverage is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Fourth, the level of disclosure may vary according to industry type (Eng and Mak, 2003). 
Wallace et al. (1994) suggest that disclosure level is likely to differ across various industries, 
reflecting their unique characteristics. The industry variable is operationalised through the 
classifications into consumer products, industrial products, construction and property, trading 




4.5 Regression model 
To test the association between the dependent variables (CSD, FCMD, DSMD, FLD and CSRD) 
with the independent variable (CGS) and control variables (OCON, SIZE, LEV and IND), a 
multiple linear regression model is constructed and performed cross-sectionally for each of the 
three sample periods. The model is represented as: 
DIjt = β0 + β1CGSjt + β2OCONjt + β3SIZEjt + β4LEVjt + β5INDjt + εjt  
where DIjt = disclosure indices categorized into CSD, FCMD, DSMD, FLD and CSRD for firm j in year t; 
CGSjt = corporate governance composite score for firm j in year t; OCONjt = ownership concentration is 
measured as the proportion of shares held by top five shareholders for firm j in year t; SIZEjt = natural log 
of total assets for firm j in year t; LEVjt = ratio of total debt to total assets for firm j in year t; INDjt = 1 if 
firm engaged in industrial, trading and service, consumer, construction and property, or plantation sector; 
0 if otherwise; β0 = intercept; β = estimated coefficient for each item; εjt = error term. 
 
5.0 Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics provided in Table 2 shows the mean disclosure of each category of 
information for all sample firms for all years.  Corporate and Strategic Disclosure (CSD) has the 
highest mean disclosure of 40.1% followed by Directors and Senior Management Disclosure 
(DSMD) of 36.8%. Financial and Capital Market Disclosure (FCMD) and Forward Looking 
Disclosure (FLD) registered mean disclosures of 29.8% and 27.1% respectively. Corporate 
Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) has the lowest disclosure with an average of 17.1%. 
There is a great diversity of disclosure of all these categories as reflected by the range of 
communication from 0% to above 80%.  
 
Sample firms generally exhibit a moderate corporate governance structure, based on the CGS 
measure, with an overall aggregate score of 46.6%. Ownership structure of the sample firms is 
characterized by concentrated shareholdings with the top five shareholders (OCON) averaging 
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TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics for all sample firms for sample years (1996, 2001 and 2006) 
 CSD FCMD DSMD FLD CSRD CGS OCON SIZE       LEV 
Mean 40.066 29.822 36.833 27.091 17.145 46.617 59.294 5.910 0.411 
SE 1.072 1.139 1.613 0.829 1.159 1.346 0.947 0.036 0.014 
Median 40.000 26.320 33.330 27.270 8.700 46.150 60.290 5.898 0.399 
SD 18.577 19.721 27.940 14.357 20.074 23.313 16.398 0.624 0.242 
Kurtosis -0.567 -0.117 -0.489 0.429 0.765 -1.061 -0.531 0.996 1.357 
Skewness 0.094 0.739 0.352 0.209 1.269 0.089 -0.373 -0.006 0.695 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 17.890 3.878 0.002 
Maximum 84.620 88.890 100.000 72.730 82.610 92.310 90.700 7.737 1.612 
N 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
CSD is the acronym for the corporate and strategic disclosure index; FCMD is the financial and capital market data 
disclosure index; DSMD is the directors and senior management disclosure index; FLD is the forward-looking 
disclosure index; and CSRD is the corporate social responsibility disclosure index. These disclosure scores are 
normalized to 100. The explanatory variables include CGS the corporate governance composite score; OCON the 
ownership concentration percentage; SIZE the firm size and LEV the leverage figure. 
 
The extent of voluntary disclosure for all categories of information increases from 1996 to 2006, 
as shown by the average scores over time for CSD, FCMD, DSMD, FLD and CSRD (see Table 
3). Paired t-tests are performed to test for differences between the means of the different 
categories of information over the study period. The difference in means of each category of 
information between two periods (1996 and 2001; 2001 and 2006; 1996 and 2006) is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The largest change (196.1%) in mean DSMD occurs between 1996 
(pre-financial crisis) and 2001 (post Asian crisis). Although the extent of CSRD is low (see 
Table 2), the sample firms show an improvement in disclosing this category of information as 
reflected by the positive change (74.9%) between 1996 and 2001. All the other categories, 
namely, CSD, FCMD, and FLD, demonstrate moderate increases between the two periods.  
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The differences in means of DSMD, FLD, and CSRD between 2001 and 2006 are statistically 
significant at the 1% level and statistically significant at 5% for CSD and FCMD. The CSRD 
continues to increase from 2001 to 2006 as depicted by the largest change in mean of 35.6%. 
Overall, the increases in all categories of information between 2001 and 2006 are not as 
pronounced as the increases between 1996 and 2001.  
 
Between 1996 and 2006, the increase in means of all categories of information is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. There are marked increases in DSMD and CSRD with 236.5% and 
137.2% increases respectively from 1996 to 2006. The increases in FCMD and FLD both 
average 35.0% whilst the CSD category shows the least increase (27.3%) over the 11 years. 
Overall, there is a significant increase in the extent of voluntary disclosure of all categories of 
information over time. 
 
Such observed disclosure patterns may be explained by a number of reasons. The enhanced 
reporting regime in Malaysia appears to have an impact on firms to provide more transparent 
reporting of information of a voluntary nature. Further, the introduction of MCCG and 
subsequent initiatives provides more impetus for firm management to adopt disclosure practices 
that are in excess of statutory requirements in order to create greater transparency and greater 
flow of information to stakeholders. The change in the regulatory environment appears to have 
led to greater transparency, which may in turn become an important driver of a firm’s disclosure 
practices.   
 
TABLE 3: Paired t-tests for mean voluntary index by categories of information 
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CSD 1996 2001 2006 2006-1996 
Mean 34.802 41.091 44.304  
% change CSD (CSD t - CSD 1−t )  18.071 7.819 27.303 
Correlation  0.646 0.703 0.598 
t-Stat  -4.367 -2.108 -5.644 
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.000 0.018 0.000 
FCMD     
Mean 25.007 30.568 33.898  
% change FCMD (FCMD t - FCMD 1−t )  22.238 10.894 35.592 
Correlation  0.778 0.718 0.642 
t-Stat  -4.369 -2.243 -5.398 
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.000 0.013 0.000 
DSMD     
Mean 15.083 44.667 50.750  
% change DSMD (DSMD t - DSMD 1−t )  196.141 13.618 236.471 
Correlation  0.589 0.627 0.431 
t-Stat  -13.889 -3.156 -13.772 
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.000 0.001 0.000 
FLD     
Mean 23.059 27.025 31.189  
% change FLD (FLD t - FLD 1−t )  17.199 15.408 35.257 
Correlation  0.422 0.371 0.553 
t-Stat  -2.701 -2.621 -6.037 
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.004 0.005 0.000 
CSRD     
Mean 10.043 17.565 23.827  
% change CSRD (CSRD t - CSRD 1−t )  74.898 35.650 137.251 
Correlation  0.687 0.757 0.664 
t-Stat  -5.477 -3.928 -7.439 
P(T<=t) one-tail  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Paired t-test results for the five categories of information for all sample firms. For each category, the hypothesized 
mean difference = 0; df = 99; and t critical one-tailed = 1.660. 
 
Pearson’s product-moment correlations between each key information category and the 
continuous predictor variables are computed (see Table 4). CSD and DSMD are positively 
correlated with the CGS in all years. FLD and CSRD are positively correlated with CGS in the 
latter two periods. Positive correlations are also noted between OCON and FCMD, DSMD and 
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CSRD in all years. SIZE is consistently correlated with all information categories throughout the 
observation periods. Firm size is also strongly correlated with CGS in 2001, the year when the 
MCCG is implemented. Such correlations indicate that larger firms tend to be correlated with 
stronger corporate governance structure and higher voluntary disclosure. LEV is negatively 
correlated with FCMD in 1996 only.  
 






















CSD 1.000 0.374* 0.359* 0.445* 0.518* 0.195* 0.152 0.563* -0.028 
FCMD  1.000 0.534* 0.294* 0.380* 0.069 0.293* 0.314* -0.246* 
DSMD   1.000 0.218** 0.520* 0.198** 0.245* 0.386* -0.047 
FLD    1.000 0.236* -0.044 0.163 0.375* -0.007 
CSRD     1.000 0.104 0.313* 0.398* -0.008 
CGS      1.000 -0.004 0.151 -0.125 
OCON       1.000 0.008 -0.171** 
SIZE        1.000 0.146 
LEV         1.000 
 
2001 
CSD 1.000 0.411* 0.337* 0.431* 0.527* 0.346* 0.270* 0.580* 0.039 
FCMD  1.000 0.450* 0.193** 0.409* 0.299* 0.193** 0.470* -0.072 
DSMD   1.000 0.251* 0.382* 0.384* 0.222** 0.311* 0.036 
FLD    1.000 0.141 0.222** 0.036 0.345* 0.011 
CSRD     1.000 0.425* 0.250* 0.373* -0.032 
CGS      1.000 0.276* 0.193** -0.123 
OCON       1.000 0.073 -0.376* 
SIZE        1.000 0.248* 
LEV         1.000 
 
2006 
CSD 1.000 0.588* 0.556* 0.575* 0.662* 0.227** 0.267* 0.636* 0.053 
FCMD  1.000 0.492* 0.438* 0.621* 0.102 0.283* 0.544* -0.156 
DSMD   1.000 0.420* 0.609* 0.339* 0.177** 0.380* 0.055 
FLD    1.000 0.417* 0.183** 0.177** 0.332* 0.020 
CSRD     1.000 0.211** 0.259* 0.526* -0.042 
CGS      1.000 0.061 -0.004 -0.099 
OCON       1.000 0.034 -0.359* 
SIZE        1.000 0.153 
LEV         1.000 
Pearson correlation matrix shows the correlation coefficients for all the continuous explanatory variables and the 




None of the correlation coefficients in Table 4 is above 0.7, suggesting that multicollinearity is 
not problematic in this study (Gujarati, 1995). Multicollinearity issues are again checked against 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs). None of the variables in the model has VIF scores (not shown 
for brevity) that exceed 2.5 in each year; these scores do not come close to the VIF 10 score or 
above that is considered problematic (Neter et al., 1983). Thus, multicollinearity in this study is 
also not considered a concern in the regression analysis. Moreover, graphs of residuals show that 
the distribution of the residuals is normal for each year. The spread of the residuals is virtually 
the same for any value of CSD, FCMD, DSMD, FLD and CSRD, thus the assumption of 
homoscedasticity has been met (Lind et al., 2004). It is concluded that the results of the 
regression analysis can be interpreted with a reasonable degree of confidence. 
 
5.2 Regression results 
Table 5 displays the cross-sectional results of the OLS regression models used to test the five 
hypotheses (H1a-H1e). The significant F-statistics and adjusted 2R  in each of the sample periods 
show that the corporate governance determinant is significant in explaining variation in the 
disclosure of voluntary information. The amount of explained variation, reflected in adjusted 2R , 
in the five information categories increases over the years particularly for CSD (from 36.2% in 
1996 to 56.7% in 2006), FCMD (from 26.3% in 1996 to 43.1% in 2006), and CSRD (from 
20.2% in 1996 to 39.8% in 2006).  
 
There is a positive and statistically significant association between CGS and DSMD in 1996 (p < 
0.01). The result, as provided in Table 5 Panel A, suggests that Malaysian listed firms are 
inclined towards disclosure of directors and senior management information in the period before 
the implementation of MCCG, supporting H1c. OCON is found to be significantly (p < 0.001) 
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and positively associated with FCMD, DSMD and CSRD in 1996. The positive coefficients 
indicate that firms with a concentrated ownership structure disclose more information relating to 
financial and capital market data, directors and senior management and corporate social 
responsibility. SIZE is a significant predictor in explaining the variability of firms’ disclosure of 
all categories information (p < 0.001) in 1996. The association between FCMD and LEV is 
negatively and statistically significant in 1996 (p < 0.01). Firms in the industrial product, and 
construction and property sectors tend to make CSD, FCMD and FLD in 1996.  
 
Table 5 Panel B shows that the extent of voluntary disclosure of all categories (CSD, FCMD, 
DSMD, FLD and CSRD) is positively and statistically significant with CGS in 2001. The results 
suggest that firms with enhanced corporate governance structures are associated with more 
extensive voluntary disclosure of corporate and strategic information, financial and capital 
market data information, directors and senior management information, forward-looking 
information and corporate social responsibility information. All hypotheses (H1a – H1e) are 
supported in the post-Asian financial crisis period after the implementation of MCCG. OCON is 
found to be significantly and positively associated with CSD and DSMD (p < 0.05 and p < 0.01 
respectively). The results demonstrate that a higher proportion of shares concentrated in the top 
five shareholders are associated with higher voluntary disclosure of corporate and strategic 
information, and directors and senior management information. Again, SIZE is a consistently 
significant predictor in explaining the variability of firms’ disclosure in all categories. LEV is 
negatively and statistically significantly associated with FLD (p < 0.01) in 2001. Firms in 
industrial, trading and service, and construction and property sectors are more inclined to 
disclose corporate and strategic information and forward-looking information. However, these 
firms disclose less financial and capital market data information in 2001.  
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Table 5 Panel C reports that the strength of a governance structure system is a good predictor 
variable of information disclosure in 2006. The results support the predictions of a positive 
association between CGS and all categories of information disclosure (CSD, FCMD, DSMD, 
FLD and CSRD). Again, all hypotheses (H1a – H1e) are supported in this latter period. The 
results suggest that firms with enhanced governance structures continue to engage in higher 
levels of voluntary disclosure. OCON is found to be significantly and positively associated with 
the disclosure of all categories of information in 2006. SIZE is a consistently significant 
predictor in explaining the variability of firms’ disclosure of all categories. LEV is no longer 
significant in 2006. Firms in the construction and property sectors disclose more CSD and 
CSRD, firms in the plantation sector are more inclined to provide CSD and FCMD, while firms 
in the trading and service and consumer sectors tend to release more CSRD.  
 
Overall, the results support the predictions of a positive association between the strength of 
corporate governance structure of sample firms and the categories of information disclosure after 
the MCCG is implemented in 2001. The enhanced governance strategies adopted in the wake of 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis and rampant corporate scandals have made Malaysian firms more 
accountable for their operations and activities via greater disclosure in their annual reports. Firms 
with stronger governance structure communicate a greater extent of both financial and non-
financial information which is regarded as important to firms’ stakeholders to facilitate their 
economic decision-making. Financial information may be more directly associated with 
proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 1983) which may give rise to concern that some disclosures might 
jeopardize the firm’s competitive position in the market. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Core 
(2001) highlight that a well-designed governance structure can help ensure a firm’s optimal 
disclosure policy. Implicitly, firms with stronger corporate governance oversight of the financial 
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reporting process may fear the proprietary cost less and may be more inclined to disclose 
relevant information. These firms are more likely to be oriented towards the capital market and 
may fare better with the investment community. On the other hand, non-financial information 
often proves fundamental to better understanding the opportunities and risks of investing in a 
company. The uncertain business environment following the 1997 Asian financial crisis and 
corporate scandals may have increased the willingness of Malaysian firms to disclose non-
financial information. These firms have a major impact on society and may wish to more clearly 
discharge their social responsibility especially after forceful external pressures.  
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TABLE 5: Multiple Regression: Five Key Information Categories  
Panel A: 1996 CSD FCMD DSMD FLD CSRD 












(t Stat) P-value 
Coeff. 









































































































































Adjusted 2R   0.362  0.263  0.207  0.165  0.202 
F-value  8.016  5.414  4.239  3.451  4.125 
Significance   0.000*  0.000*  0.000*  0.002*  0.000* 














































SIZE 17.529  11.251 0.000* 7.579  7.746 0.001* 11.457 0.000* 
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IND5 - - - - - - - - - - 
Adjusted 2R   0.410  0.344  0.157  0.109  0.250 
F-value  9.607  7.503  3.308  2.510  5.135 
Significance   0.000*  0.000*  0.002*  0.008**  0.000* 




























































































































































Adjusted 2R   0.567  0.431  0.079  0.158  0.398 
F-value  16.895  10.362  2.062  3.235  9.196 
Significance   0.000*  0.000*  0.024**  0.001*  0.000* 
Table 5 provides the results of the multiple regression testing based on the regression equation. The equation is stated as: DIjt = β0 + β1CGSjt + β2OCONjt + 
β3Sizejt + β4Leveragejt + β5Indjt + εjt where DI is represented by CSD = corporate and strategic disclosure index; FCMD = financial and capital market data 
disclosure index; DSMD = directors and senior management disclosure index; FLD = forward-looking disclosure index; and CSRD = corporate social 
responsibility disclosure index. Independent variable: CGS = corporate governance composite score for firm j in year t; control variables: OCON = ownership 
concentration measured as top five shareholders for firm j in year t; SIZE = firm size measured as natural log of total assets for firm j in year t; LEV = leverage 
calculated as ratio of total debt to total assets for firm j in year t; IND1jt = 1 if firm engaged in industrial sector, 0 if otherwise; IND2jt =  1 if firm engaged in 
trading and service sector, 0 if otherwise;  IND3jt = 1 if firm engaged in consumer product sector, 0 if otherwise; IND4jt = 1 if firm engaged in construction and 
property sector, 0 if otherwise;  IND5jt = 1 if firm engaged in plantation sector, 0 if otherwise; β0 = intercept; β = estimated coefficient for each item; εjt = error 
term. Associations *, ** and # are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively (1-tailed). The coefficients of the excluded industry dummy 
variables are all 1.000 since they act as benchmarks for the included industry dummies. The excluded industry dummy variables for 1996, 2001 and 2006 are 
construction and property, plantation and industrial sectors respectively. 
 31 
 
6.0 Robustness Tests 
We also conduct a pooled3 sample regression by pooling the entire three periods dataset to 
capture the effect of differing regulatory regimes on the extent of voluntary disclosure. The 
pooled data set contains a total of 300 observations over three periods. A pooled sample 
regression is estimated with additional variables, YEAR dummies. The results (not shown for 
brevity) show a positive and statistical significant change in the five sub-categories of 
disclosures (CSD, FCMD, DSMD, FLD and CSRD) occurring between 2001 and 1996, and 
between 2006 and 1996. These results demonstrate that the introduction of MCCG and the shift 
to a disclosure-based regime in 2001, as well as subsequent regulatory initiatives implemented 
between 2002 and 2006, have fundamentally increased the extent of disclosures of the five sub-
categories information. Further, there is a positive and statistical significant association between 
the five sub-categories of information and CGS, OCON and SIZE. Overall, the pooled regression 
results are similar to the multiple regression results on panel data set as reported in the preceding 
section.  
 
To further examine the earlier results reported, the panel data and the pooled regression models 
are re-estimated by incorporating the interaction variable of CGS with YEAR (CGS x YEAR). 
There is a positive and statistical association between the interaction variable and all five sub-
categories of disclosures in 2006 in all models re-estimated (results not reported for brevity). A 
similar positive and statistical association result is witnessed in 2001 but only four sub-categories 
of information are affected, viz. CSD, FCMD, DSMD and CSRD. These results indicate that 
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corporate governance exhibits a strong monitoring presence over the extent of corporate 
communication of different types of information in latter periods.  
 
7.0 Conclusions 
Using a sample of 100 Malaysian listed firms, we examined the association between the strength 
of corporate governance structure and the extent of different types of information voluntarily 
communicated in key periods from 1996 to 2006. Malaysian firms tend to disclose more 
corporate and strategic information throughout the study periods while the disclosure of directors 
and senior management information increases in post Asian financial crisis periods. Financial 
and capital market data, forward-looking information, and corporate social responsibility 
information fetched relatively lower average disclosures. There are statistically significant 
increases in all five of the key information categories, with the increase most pronounced 
between 1996 and 2001.  
 
The observed disclosure patterns in the latter two periods take place in the enhanced regulatory 
environment which promotes greater corporate transparency and accountability. The introduction 
of the disclosure-based regime, the MCCG and the subsequent initiatives appear to provide 
impetus for firm management to adopt disclosure practices that are in excess of statutory 
requirements in order to create a greater flow of information to stakeholders. The trend analysis 
demonstrates that Malaysian firms perceive voluntary disclosure as a type of a monitoring 
system to induce management to provide greater disclosures of different types of information so 
as to narrow the information asymmetry between management and shareholders. The evidence is 
consistent with results from Botosan (1997) and Barako et al. (2006).  
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The statistical findings are consistent with the hypothesized association that the strength of a 
firm’s corporate governance structure is a potentially important determinant of a firm’s 
disclosure policy with regard to the different categories of voluntary information particularly in 
post crisis periods. There is a significant and positive association between corporate governance 
structure and firms’ disclosure of all key categories of information in 2001 and 2006; in 
particular, the statistical association between a firm’s corporate governance structure and 
corporate and strategic information and corporate social responsibility information is 
strengthened in 2001 and 2006. The results suggest that the enhancement of corporate 
governance structure appears to lead to a higher level of voluntary disclosure of such information. 
These findings provide some empirical and theoretical justification for regulatory regime change 
in that the spirit of corporate governance principles and recommendations do seem to enhance 
transparency through the change of management’s communication practices towards more 
voluntary disclosure of different types of information.  
 
The trend analysis of the different categories of information disclosure over time has 
implications for business policy and practice. The structural transformation of the Malaysian 
economy from the development of industrial base and service sectors in the last twenty years 
towards a knowledge-based economy has provided greater international access for Malaysian 
firms in this globalised environment. The market-oriented economic policy has made it vitally 
important that Malaysian firms successfully compete internationally (Malaysia Industrial 
Development Authority, 2008). In view of the positive links to the extent of voluntary disclosure 
revealed in this study, the policy issue for Malaysian regulators and policy-setters is that they 
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should continue to encourage greater communication, particularly financial and capital market 
data, forward-looking, and corporate social responsibility information in order to attract wider 
participation from foreign investors. The findings have implications for investors who could 
associate with companies that have enhanced governance structure, as such companies provide 
greater communication of corporate information to facilitate decision-making. 
 
The study has a number of limitations. The measure of the aggregate Corporate Governance 
Score (CGS) is not all-encompassing. Due to concerns about efficacy, not all the corporate 
governance attributes of the MCCG are included to derive the aggregate corporate governance 
score. The use of an index to arrive at an overall corporate governance score involves attaching 
an equal weighting to the various governance attributes. This assumes that every attribute is 
equally important to all firms. As highlighted by Larcker et al. (2005), using a summary measure 
of corporate governance characteristics has the potential to mask major underlying relationships. 
Another concern from the study arises from the use of the self-constructed disclosure index in 
that the existence of certain disclosures is measured and not the underlying informativeness of 
the disclosed items. Relative informativeness across different disclosure items is likely to vary 
according to who the users of the financial information are. Further, the different key information 
categories are solely constructed on the information disclosed in the annual reports. The 
possibilities of other forms of alternative information avenues such as press releases and 
conference calls could be considered in a future study. Another limitation of the study is that it 
does not directly address endogeneity concerns caused by unobservable firm-specific factors and 
omitted variables that may potentially affect corporate governance and ownership structure, and 
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that may affect voluntary disclosure of information simultaneously. Also, we did not attempt in 
this study to find the causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables.  
 
Notwithstanding these caveats, the results reveal valuable insights into the role played by the 
corporate governance framework in influencing the corporate communication pattern of listed 
firms in Malaysia. Future research could utilize and expand this study’s voluntary disclosure 
instrument to investigate the determinants of voluntary disclosure practices in the regional 
context. Future research could also examine the link between individual corporate governance 
structural characteristics and the key disclosure categories. In addition, the list of control 
variables appropriate to the Malaysian context such as politically connected firms, ethnicity, 




1 The preliminary disclosure checklist is subject to a thorough screening in order to ensure its content validity. The 
screening processes involve: (a) the checking of items disclosed voluntarily in 1996; (b) the checking of items in the 
subsequent two periods which entailed the elimination of any items that subsequently became mandated; and (c) the 
refining for appropriateness of each disclosure item in the Malaysian context. 
 
2 To ensure that the assessment of applicability of a particular item of information to the firm is not biased, the entire 
annual report for each sample firm is read twice. The first reading is to gain familiarization with the circumstances 
of each firm and provide insightful knowledge to form an opinion as to whether an undisclosed item is, in fact, 
inapplicable to that firm. The second reading is to carefully quantify the items voluntarily disclosed by a particular 
firm against the disclosure rating sheet. The disclosure scoring procedure is completed by one and the same 
researcher to ensure consistency. As a further reliability check of the scoring sheet, the auditor from a Big Four 
accounting firm scores annual reports of 10 sample firms from each year (representing 10% of the total sample size). 
The unweighted voluntary disclosure index scores of this independent evaluator are then compared with the 
researcher’s to ascertain if there are any statistically significant differences. Results of the t-tests indicate that mean 
voluntary disclosure scores in each year are virtually the same and do not differ significantly (p ≤ 0.05) between the 
researcher and the independent evaluator. Based on the measures undertaken, the subjectivity problem arising from 
the scoring procedure with the disclosure instrument is deemed minimal. The scores for each voluntary disclosure 
item are considered reliable. 
 
3 This study includes the repeated measures i.e., non-independent cases which violate a key statistical assumption for 
regression. Therefore, this is not the prime analytical tool used in this study. Nonetheless, the observation from the 
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Voluntary Disclosure Instrument Appendix 1 
 
Corporate and strategic disclosure index (CSD) 
1 Financial highlights – 5 years and more 
2 Pictures of major types of product 
3 Discussion of company’s major products / services / projects 
4 Information on new product development 
5 Discussion of industry trends (past) 
6 Information on acquisitions and expansion 
7 Statement of ways of improvement in product quality 
8 General statement of corporate strategy 
9 Organization structure /  group chart 
10 Information relating to the general outlook of the economy 
11 Discussion of competitive environment 
12 Information on disposal and cessation 
13 A statement of corporate goals 
14 Vision and mission statement 
15 Description of marketing and distribution network for products/services  
16 Statement of ways of improvement in customer service 
17 Discussion of principal markets 
18 Actions taken during the year to achieve the corporate goal 
19 Brief history of the company 
20 Significant events calendar 
21 Reasons for the acquisitions & expansion 
22 Impact of strategy on current and/or future results 
23 Discussion about major regional economic development 
24 Reasons for the disposal and cessation 
25 Description of R&D projects 
26 Impact of competition on current profit 
27 Company’s contribution to the national economy 
28 Information about regional political stability 
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Financial and capital market data disclosure index (FCMD) 
29 Key financial ratios eg. return on assets, return on shareholders’ funds, leverage, 
liquidity 
30 Review of operations by divisions - operating profit 
31 Review of operations - productivity 
32 Review of current financial results, discussion of major factors underlying 
performance 
33 Effect of acquisitions & expansion on results 
34 Effect of disposal & cessation on results 
35 Statement concerning wealth created eg. value added statement 
36 Volume of shares traded (trend)  
37 Volume of shares traded (year-end) 
38 Share price information (trend)  
39 Share price information (year-end) 
40 Market capitalization (trend) 
41 Market capitalization (year-end) 
42 Analysis of distribution of shareholdings by type of shareholders 
43 Domestic and foreign shareholdings breakdown 
44 Segmental reporting on size, growth rate on product market 
45 Segment reporting on all lines of business production data 
46 Segment reporting on geographical capital expenditure 
47 Segment reporting on geographical production 
Directors and senior management disclosure index (DSMD) 
48 Academic & professional qualifications of directors 
49 Position or office held by executive directors 
50 Picture of senior management team 
51 Senior management responsibilities, experience and background 
Forward-looking disclosure index (FLD) 
52 Discussion of specific external factors affecting company’s prospects (economy, 
politics, technology) 
53 Discussion of company’s prospects (general) 
54 Discussion of likely effect of business strategy on future performance 
55 Discussion of future industry trend 
56 Discussion of future products/services research and development activities 
57 Planned research and development expenditure 
58 Planned capital expenditure 
59 Planned advertising and publicity expenditure 
60 Key financial data (quantitative) forecasts eg. sales revenues, profit, EPS 
61 Qualitative forecasts of sales, revenues, profits, EPS 
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62 Forecast assumptions provided 
Corporate social responsibility disclosure index (CSRD) 
63 General philanthropy 
64 Participation in government social campaigns 
65 Community programs (health and education) implemented 
66 Statement of company environmental policies 
67 Environmental protection program implemented 
68 Awards for environmental protection 
69 Support rendered for public/private action designed to protect environment 
70 Employee’s appreciation 
71 Picture of employees’ welfare 
72 Discussion of employees’ welfare 
73 Number of employees for the last two or more years 
74 Breakdown of workforce by line of business distribution 
75 Categories of employees by level of qualifications 
76 Corporate policy on employee training 
77 Amount spent on training 
78 Nature of training provided 
79 General redundancy / retrenchment information 
80 Indication of employee morale e.g. turnover, strikes and absenteeism 
81 Information about employee workplace safety 
82 Standard injury, lost day, and absentee rates and number of fatalities 
83 Health and safety standards 
84 Discussion of product safety 
85 Statement of corporate social responsibility 
CSD is the acronym for the corporate and strategic disclosure index; FCMD is the financial and capital 
market data disclosure index; DSMD is the directors and senior management disclosure index; FLD is 
the forward-looking disclosure index; and CSRD is the corporate social responsibility disclosure index. 
 
